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Abstract1
Credit markets contribute to economic development when they allocate
capital through secure and enforceable contracts. Surprisingly little is known,
however, about what these markets looked like and how they functioned in
the Dutch Republic. By analysing three archival collections from Amsterdam
this article attempts to fill this lacuna. It documents a large and developed
non-intermediated credit market that relied on standardised loan forms.
These forms were cast in the correct legal terms, could be purchased across
the city, and cost little. Where people’s own networks did not suffice to
mobilise funds, moreover, brokers stood ready to link demand and supply.
This shows that pre-industrial societies could successfully mobilise large
amounts of credit even where banks were absent.
kakaka１
1 The authors would like to thank Michael Milo for his help with the married couples form,
Yannick Slagter for research assistance, Bart Schuurman and Janine Grünfeld for referring and
giving access to collections at the Amsterdam City Archive, and the editors and referees of this
journal, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost Jonker, and seminar participants at Erasmus University Rotter-
dam, University of California at Riverside, Utrecht University, and the 9th European Historical
Economics Society Conference for valuable comments and suggestions. The authors carried out
the research for this article within the Vidi-Euryi sponsored project The Evolution of Financial
Markets in Pre-Industrial Europe. A Comparative Analysis.
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１ Introduction
Economic development relies on credit markets with secure and enforce-
able loan contracts and a good allocation of capital.２ In other words, credit
markets in which businesses and households with cash shortages succeed
in attracting money from those that have surpluses. England’s rapid nine-
teenth-century growth has been considered the hallmark case of this and
its success has been traced back to the emergence of secure property rights
and banks.３ Private credit markets in the Dutch Republic, the first econo-
my to develop a good financial system according to Sylla, have received
little attention in these respects, however.４ This lack of attention is all the
more surprising as Dutch credit markets did without deposit banks until
the 1870s.５ While credit was intermediated by notaries and aldermen in
other parts of pre-industrial Europe, data for the Dutch Republic suggest
2 See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, ‘Institutions as a fundamental
cause of long-run growth’, in: Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of econom-
ic growth 1A (Amsterdam 2005) 385-472; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei
Shleifer, Robert Vishny, ‘Law and finance’, Journal of Political Economy 106:6 (1998) 1113-1155;
Ross Levine, ‘Law, finance, and economic growth’, Journal of Financial Intermediation 8 (1999) 8-
35; Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine, ‘Legal institutions and financial development’, in: Claude
Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (eds.), Handbook of new institutional economics (Dordrecht 2005)
251-278 on enforceable (loan) contracts and Ross Levine, ‘Financial development and economic
growth. Views and agenda’, Journal of Economic Literature 35 (1997) 688-726; Ross Levine, ‘Fi-
nance and growth. Theory and evidence’, in: Aghion and Durlauf, Handbook, 865-934 on the
relationship between finance and economic development.
3 Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and commitment. The evolution of
institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England’, The Journal of Economic
History 49:4 (1989) 803-832; L.S. Pressnell, Country banking in the industrial revolution (Oxford
1956); Rondo Cameron, Banking in the early stages of industrialization. A study in comparative
economic history (Oxford 1967). Cf. Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth, Prometheus shackled.
Goldsmith banks and England’s financial revolution after 1700 (Oxford 2013).
4 Richard Sylla, ‘Financial systems and economic modernization’, The Journal of Economic
History 62:2 (2002) 277-292; Peter L. Rousseau and Richard Sylla, ‘Financial systems, economic
growth, and globalization’, in: Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor and Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.),
Globalization in historical perspective (Chicago 2003) 373-413; Marjolein ’t Hart, Joost Jonker and
Jan Luiten van Zanden (eds.), A financial history of The Netherlands (Cambridge 1997).
5 Joost Jonker, ‘The cradle of modern banking. Finance in the Netherlands between the Napo-
leonic era and the first commercial banks, 1813-1870’, in: Joh. de Vries, Wim Vroom and Ton de
Graaf (eds.), Worldwide banking. ABN AMRO Bank 1824-1999 (Amsterdam 1999) 49-94; Joost Jon-
ker,Merchants, bankers, and middlemen. The Amsterdam money market during the first half of the
19th century (Amsterdam 1996).
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that these intermediaries did not play a similar role there.６ Did other
intermediaries, such as brokers, perhaps play a role then or did there, as
was the case in rural Württemberg, exist a bustling non-intermediated
credit market?７ In other words, what did private credit markets in the
Dutch Republic look like and how did they function?
De Vries and Van der Woude claimed that a ‘tangle of debt and credit
linked the Republic’s households’. Based on estimates of the real per capita
money supply they also surmised that a low velocity of circulation during
the eighteenth century resulted in ‘cash balances so large as to suggest
hoarding’. Connecting this to the functioning of credit markets they argued
‘that financial intermediation left much to be desired’.８ However, their
reliance on cash holdings recorded in probate inventories likely overesti-
mated hoarding, and thus underestimated financial activity, because sick-
ness and imminent death may have raised people’s preference for holding
cash. The possibility that cash was simply held for unexpected expenses or
opportunities should be considered as well. Rich investors keeping 2 to 4
percent of their wealth in cash does not seem excessive in this respect and
they did not like to keep too much money laying idle either.９ Jonker docu-
mented a substantial securities-backed credit market, but these loans only
6 See Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Priceless markets. The
political economy of credit in Paris, 1660-1870 (Chicago 2000) for the notaries and Hans-Peter
Baum, ‘Annuities in late medieval Hanse towns’, Business History Review 59 (1985) 24-48; Johan
Dambruyne, ‘De 17de-eeuwse schepenregisters en de rente- en immobilientransacties te Gent:
enkele beschouwingen’, Handelingen der maatschappij voor geschiedenis en oudheidkunde te Gent
42 (1988) 153-182; H. Soly, ‘De schepenregisters als bron voor de conjunctuurgeschiedenis van
Zuid- en Noordnederlandse steden in het Ancien Régime. Een concreet voorbeeld: de Antwerpse
immobiliënmarkt in de 16de eeuw’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 87 (1974) 521-544 for the alder-
men. Christiaan van Bochove and Heleen Kole, The private credit market of eighteenth-century
Amsterdam (paper Utrecht University 2012) shows that notaries and aldermen recorded few
loans in the Dutch Republic.
7 Sheilagh Ogilvie, Markus Küpker and Janine Maegraith, ‘Household debt in early modern
Germany. Evidence from personal inventories’, The Journal of Economic History 72:1 (2012) 134-167.
8 Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, The first modern economy. Success, failure, and persever-
ance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge 1997) 87-91, 139.
9 The correspondence of Jacoba Catharina van Schoonhoven (The Hague) and her financial
adviser Pieter Leonard Stumphius (Rotterdam) shows that Van Schoonhoven was keen on find-
ing investment opportunities, but that she also preferred to hold sufficient cash. See, among
others, National Archives, Archief van de familie Van der Staal van Piershil, 1636-1904 (entry
number 3.20.54), inv.nr. 353, letter 23-12-1763: ‘Het is goedt er weer wat geldt in de banck gekomen
is voor het aenspreeken als men het weer nodig heeft om het te belegge als andersins [ . . . ]’ (‘It is
good that some money has again come into the bank to be used when needed for investments or
other purposes [ . . . ].’).
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provided a solution to a limited, richer part of society as securities typically
had denominations of 1,000 guldens.１０ Despite Jonker’s valuable contribu-
tion still little is known about the alternatives that these elites used and
about how the rest of society contracted loans.
This article analyses loan contracts that were used in Amsterdam from
the seventeenth until at least the early nineteenth century to fill this lacu-
na. These contracts have survived in three archival collections: the ledger
of two shopkeepers (1723-1725; 1797-1799), the Insolvency Chamber’s ar-
chive (1737-1809), and the documents of a silk merchant (1692-1735).
These unique collections make it possible to uncover transactions that
usually remain hidden from sight. They show that standardisation of loan
contracts in pre-printed forms and taxation by the government through
the introduction of the stamp duty (klein zegel) in 1624 not only deter-
mined the physical appearance of loans recorded in writing, but also signal
that the market for such loans was large and developed. Loan forms were
cheap, could be purchased in well over a hundred bookshops across the
city, and were used in all segments of society and the credit market. Loan
forms were this successful because they were embedded in the legal system
and because they were tailored to the needs of lenders and borrowers.
Although the nature of these sources does not allow us to observe the
work of intermediaries in detail, this article shows that pre-industrial fi-
nancial markets without banks were nevertheless able to mobilise large
amounts of credit. Additional contemporary sources demonstrate, more-
over, that brokers stood ready to match demand and supply for whom this
market did not suffice. This shows that the absence of banks from pre-
industrial societies did not impede credit markets from successfully mobi-
lising large amounts of credit.
The article first discusses the stamp duty and reviews the implications it
had on recording loans and then considers how the frequent use of credit
in seventeenth-century Amsterdam led to the introduction of standardised
loan forms. Next it discusses the sources, the types and appearance of loan
forms, and the way in which these forms were used. The final sections
address brokers’ intermediation on credit markets and conclude.
10 Jonker, Merchants, bankers, and middlemen.
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２ The stamp duty
The province of Holland introduced the stamp duty on 13 August 1624
because it needed revenues to field an army and prevent an expected
Spanish invasion. Fears of such an invasion were not ungrounded as hosti-
lities between the Republic and Spain had resumed after the Twelve Years’
Truce (1609-1621). As real estate and consumption were already taxed ex-
tensively, Holland ventured into taxing transactions of which people
wished to have written proof such as testaments, marriage contracts,
leases, and loan contracts. The provincial government did so since it had
noticed, or so it asserted, that many conflicts arose because of the docu-
ments that people drew up. It was therefore stipulated that henceforth
documents would only be admissible in litigation when drawn on paper
over which stamp duty had been paid. Since contracts were already per-
mitted as proof in litigation before and no changes were made as regarding
their content, the stamp duty really was nothing more than a means of
increasing government revenues. It should not be precluded, however, that
some lenders preferred stamped contracts over unstamped ones because
they interpreted the stamp as a form of certification.１１
The attempt to tax loans shows that already during the first half of the
seventeenth century the credit market had become large enough to make
taxation worthwhile. If the province of Holland wished to raise its reven-
ues, however, it had to set incentives such that the stamp duty would not
lead to tax evasion. This first of all meant that tax rates should not be too
high. In 1638 rates were set at four stuivers (0.20 guldens) for obligations
with a value from 200 to 600 guldens and eight stuivers (0.40 guldens) for
larger ones. These rates were raised to six and twelve stuivers (0.30 and 0.60
guldens respectively) in 1665. In 1677 rates were doubled and 0-100 guldens
(three stuivers or 0.15 guldens) and 100-200 guldens (six stuivers or 0.30
11 Cornelis Cau et al., Groot Placaet-Boeck (The Hague [etc.] 1658-1796), I 1994-1997; P.H. Engels,
De belastingen en de geldmiddelen van den aanvang der Republiek tot op heden (Utrecht 1862) 92-
97, 198-199, 350-356; Wantje Fritschy, ‘The efficiency of taxation in Holland’, in: Oscar Gelderblom
(ed.), The political economy of the Dutch Republic (Farnham 2009) 55-84, 68-69. Other provinces in
the Republic also introduced a stamp duty. See Engels, Belastingen en geldmiddelen, 92-97, 198-
199, 350-356 and Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden (7
volumes; The Hague 1996-2009).
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guldens) categories were introduced. In 1745 a larger than 2,000 guldens
category (48 stuivers or 2.40 guldens) was added to the top of the spectrum
as well. Finally, a new and more refined categorisation was put in place in
1795 when Holland was once more searching for additional revenues.１２
A logistical operation was required to provide all the stamped paper to
the public. The province provided towns with sheets of paper that each
contained a stamp mentioning the year and tariff rate. Local town secre-
taries certified these sheets by adding their signature next to the stamp.
The sheets were then sold for the rate on the stamp plus some surcharges.
In 1754, for instance, the surcharge for the sheet of paper on which the
stamp was printed amounted to eight penningen or 0.025 guldens.１３
In addition to these modest rates (see Figure 1), the province of Holland
instituted relatively large fines for noncompliance. During the period
under review here a fine of 100 guldens applied to borrowers who recog-
nised a debt on unstamped paper. Lenders who accepted such a document
would receive a fine of 50 guldens and the same applied to those who
accepted the contract in any subsequent secondary transaction. Justice
would only be served, moreover, once the appropriate tax was paid.１４
Since fines were so much higher than fees many will have found it worth-
while to comply with stamp duty regulations. Noncompliance will have
occurred most frequently among smaller loans because the stamp duty
weighed relatively heavily on those. There, access to litigation probably
was less of a concern too because legal expenses were large relative to the
principal. Likewise, lenders who expected to be able to enforce (re)pay-
ment through informal mechanisms instead of the courts may also have
complied less often. The stamp will thus have changed the physical ap-
pearance of many, but definitely not all, recorded loans.
12 Cau et al., Groot Placaet-Boeck, I 2010-2017; II 3181-3188; III 1020-1037; V 1123-1150; VII 1455-1485;
IX 1080-1112. Until around the middle of the seventeenth century tariff increases coincided with
inflation. See Jan Luiten van Zanden, ‘The prices of the most important consumer goods, and
indices of wages and the cost of living in the western part of the Netherlands, 1450-1800’, http://
www.iisg.nl/hpw (11 December 2012).
13 See, for instance, Cau et al., Groot Placaet-Boeck, VII 1479-1480; VIII 1151. By the seventeenth
century the penning had become an accounting coin only. Sixteen of them constituted one
stuiver and twenty stuivers made up one gulden.
14 Cau et al., Groot Placaet-Boeck, III 1020-1021, 1034; VII 1455-1456, 1475-1476.
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Figure 1. The relative costs of the stamp duty, 1677-1794
Source: Cau et al., Groot Placaet-Boeck, III 1020-1307; VII 1455-1485.
３ Standardisation
The emergence of standardised pre-printed forms constituted the second
major modification in the appearance of loan contracts. When such forms
appeared first is unclear, but it is not unlikely that this coincided with the
rise of bookshops during the seventeenth century. A town ordinance shows
that already in 1647 bookshops sold stamped paper to notaries, brokers,
and private people.１５ Booksellers presumably built on the economies of
scale created by Amsterdam’s booming economy and growing population
when they started offering pre-printed forms.１６ The oldest specimen re-
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15 ‘[ . . . ] dat verscheyde Boeck-verkoopers binnen deser Stede hen vervorderen soo aen Notar-
isen, Makelaers als andere particulieren persoonen te verkoopen alrehande soorten van bese-
gelde francijnen ende papieren [. . . ]’. See Hermannus Noordkerk, Handvesten, ofte Privilegien
ende Octroyen, Mitsgaders Willekeuren, Costuimen, Ordonnantien en Handelingen der Stad Am-
stelredam (Amsterdam 1748), III 229.
16 The emergence of basic and unambiguous loan contracts by the early sixteenth century
obviously was a prerequisite too. See Alphons van den Bichelaer, Het notariaat in Stad en Meierij
van ’s-Hertogenbosch tijdens de Late Middeleeuwen (1306-1531) (Amsterdam 1998); A.Fl. Gehlen,
Notariële akten uit de 17e en 18e eeuw. Handleiding voor gebruikers (Zutphen 1986). Likewise, high
literacy levels will have been helpful as well. Lower paper prices, however, unlikely contributed to
the rise of the loan forms analysed here. During the hundred years after 1475 paper became
cheaper relative to rye bread, but from around 1575 onwards their relative price stabilised. See
Van Zanden, ‘Prices of the most important consumer goods’. See C.C. van de Graft, Lotgevallen
van een Amsterdams koopmanshuis 1749-1949 (Amsterdam 1949) for the history of the company of
the Dronsberg family. The form in Figure 4 was printed by this company.
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trieved here was signed in 1660 and by the early eighteenth century they
had become common enough for Le Moine de l’Espine to discuss them in
his famous merchant manual. Silk merchant Simon Bevel, whose borrow-
ing will be discussed in more detail below, used the forms of six different
Amsterdam booksellers between 1700 and 1720.１７
Loan forms were typically similar to A4 size and often they were A3-size
sheets folded in half. They contained the text of a loan contract to which
the contracting parties only had to add their names, the date, and the
loan’s size, interest rate, and term.１８ Booksellers usually advertised for
their businesses by including the name and location of their company, as
well as its merchandise, in the header of loan forms.１９ Here they styled
themselves in different ways, including book and paper seller, pen and
paper seller, art and bookseller, printer, printer and paper seller, and prin-
ter and bookseller. Bookseller Dirk Schuurman explicitly advertised that he
sold all kinds of stamped paper.２０
The number of booksellers who sold loan forms is unknown, but forms
that survived in the Insolvency Chamber may provide a lower-bound esti-
mate. By linking company names in the headers with the years in the
stamps it could be established when particular booksellers must have
been active. The case of Jan Schalker, who owned a shop on the Lelie-
17 J.A. Gruys and C. de Wolf, Thesaurus 1473-1800. Nederlandse boekdrukkers en boekverkopers,
met plaatsen en jaren van werkzaamheid (Nieuwkoop 1989); Bibliopolis, http://www.bibliopolis.nl
(11 December 2012). Pit Dehing, Geld in Amsterdam. Wisselbank en wisselkoersen, 1650-1725 (Hil-
versum 2012) 92, 105 and Eric Slot, Vijf gulden eeuwen. Momenten uit 500 jaar gemeentefinanciën
(Amsterdam 1990) 58 wrongly interpreted the oldest loan forms as receipts from the Wisselbank.
Jacques le Moine de l’Espine, Le negoce d’Amsterdam (Amsterdam 1710) 40-41 briefly mentioned
loan forms, but later editions treated them rather elaborately.
18 Besides Amsterdam, the use of loan forms can so far be documented in Haarlem and Leeu-
warden. See Amsterdam City Archive (further ACA), Archief van de Familie Brants en Aanver-
wante Families (entry number 88) (further Brants), inv.nrs. 1743, 1744A, 1744B for a Haarlem form
stamped in 1687 and signed in 1693. See Leeuwarder Courant, 14-06-1775 for forms in Leeuwarden.
Ommelander courant, 30-11-1787, 07-05-1793, 12-06-1795 andMiddelburgsche courant, 21-10-1758, 31-
01-1760, 26-04-1760, 02-08-1760, 01-07-1762, 30-12-1762 contain evidence of all kinds of printed
financial forms – including bottomry loans, but not regular ones – in the towns of Groningen
and Middelburg. See Leo Adriaenssen, ‘Spaanse wol voor Tilburg’, Tilburg, tijdschrift voor geschie-
denis, monumenten en cultuur 17:1 (1999) 3-16 for a loan form signed in 1664 in Tilburg in which
the lender’s name, that of Rotterdam merchant Paulus Verschueren, was also pre-printed. This
evidence suggests that (loan) forms were used throughout the Republic.
19 Booksellers J. Groenewout Jansz. and C. Groenewout each ran a shop at a different location,
but the header of their form advertised both companies. Using a form’s header to advertise was
not restricted to loan forms and can also be documented for lease forms. See Clé Lesger, Huur en
conjuctuur. De woningmarkt in Amsterdam, 1550-1850 (Amsterdam 1986) 63, 88, 97, 177.
20 ‘Deeze en alle zoorten van Gezegelde Papieren’.
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gracht, may be used to illustrate the procedure. In this particular collection
Schalker can be found as a seller of loan forms with stamps dated 1775-1776,
1778, 1781-1782, 1784-1787, 1789-1791, 1793-1797, and 1799. The intermittences
obviously do not mean that Schalker did not sell forms in those years, but
rather that there were no insolvencies in which his forms were involved.
Given his prolonged activity as a seller of loan forms it is likely, however,
that Schalker also sold them in 1783 and 1788, for example. It is therefore
assumed that Schalker started selling loan forms in 1775 and stopped in
1799. Applying this method to the other forms yields a minimum of over
fifty booksellers during the late 1780s. Given the particular nature of the
source used for this analysis it is not unlikely that bookshops throughout
Amsterdam sold loan forms. According to Le Moine de l’Espine loan forms
could indeed be purchased from every bookseller.２１ This would mean that
the number of shops selling loan forms exceeded 150 throughout the peri-
od under review here.２２
The geographical threshold to purchase loan forms was low. Many
shops were located in the commercial district, but loan forms were also
sold in other and poorer neighbourhoods. In the western part of town this
included the Anjeliersgracht, Haarlemmerdijk, Laurierstraat, Lindengracht,
Rozengracht, and Tweede Tuindwarsstraat. And in the eastern part of town
this included the Geldersekade, Jodenbreestraat, Schippersgracht, Sint An-
toniesbreestraat, Wittenburgergracht, and Zeedijk. The same applied with
respect to costs. A newspaper advertisement in Leeuwarden, a town in the
province of Frisia with around 15,000 inhabitants, offered them at a cost of
only one stuiver (0.05 guldens).２３ In Amsterdam, with its more vibrant
economy and larger number of bookshops, prices surely will not have
been higher. The wide availability of cheap and standardised loan forms
21 ‘[E]en gedrukte Obligatie [. . . ], gelyk men by alle Boekverkoopers deser Stadt kan te koop
krygen’. Jacques le Moine de l’Espine, De koophandel van Amsterdam (Rotterdam 1753) 573-574.
22 In 1742 there were 136 shops selling books or paper according to W.F.H. Oldewelt, Kohier van
de personeele quotisatie te Amsterdam over het jaar 1742 I (Amsterdam 1945). Arie Cornelis Kruse-
man, Aanteekeningen betreffende den boekhandel van Noord-Nederland in de 17e en 18e eeuw
(Amsterdam 1893) 497 mentions even more publishers and booksellers. It is not unlikely that
Oldewelt’s figure represents an underestimate because some shopkeepers probably did not make
the 600-gulden threshold to be included in his tax register, the Personele Quotisatie.
23 ‘Te Leeuwarden by G. TRESLING zyn te bekomen: Gedrukte OBLIGATIEN, zeer dienstig voor
die geene die Geld Negotieeren of Geld uitzetten, kost op best Schryfpapier één Stuiver.’ Leeu-
warder Courant, 14-06-1775. Tresling placed this advertisement at other moments as well. Jan de
Vries, European Urbanization 1500-1800 (Cambridge [Mass.] 1984) 271.Middelburgsche courant, 31-
01-1760, 26-04-1760, 02-08-1760 priced forms at 0.5 stuivers (bond transfers), 1.5 stuivers (rent
contracts) and 2 stuivers (bottomry loans).
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must have greatly facilitated the recording of loans and may also have
diminished the threshold for lending (and thus have increased the number
of transactions).
Figure 2. Loan contracts and sources used in this paper
Handwritten Form
Stamped Bevel
Insolvency Chamber
Bevel
Insolvency Chamber
Unstamped Bevel
Insolvency Chamber
Hendrick Estinghuijsen and
Fransiscus de Witt
Hendrick Estinghuijsen and
Fransiscus de Witt
Source: See text.
４ Sources
Based on the foregoing, Figure 2 schematically represents the four possible
shapes a loan contract could take. Analysing these four types of privately
recorded loans systematically is difficult because sources have often not
survived. The remainder of this article uses contracts of successfully com-
pleted transactions that survived by chance as well as contracts on which the
borrower defaulted. These contracts stem from three archival collections.
First, the archive of Simon Bevel (1669-1736).２４ Bevel, a Haarlem silk
merchant who had turned a small inheritance into a big business, regularly
borrowed in Amsterdam to finance his silk trade. Purchases of silk from the
Dutch East India Company were often paid for by his lenders. Loans were
secured by a general mortgage (i.e. person and goods) and in many in-
24 Leonie van Nierop, ‘Brieven van den Amsterdamschen makelaar Robert Hennebo aan den
Haarlemschen zijdereeder Simon Bevel over Engelsche fondsen (1735-1736)’, Economisch-histor-
isch jaarboek 17 (1931) 47-80; I.H. van Eeghen, Archief van de familie Brants en aanverwante
families (version 43.1) (Amsterdam 2011).
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stances supplies of silk were handed over as collateral. Bevel’s archive
contains bundles of loan contracts, 323 made during the period 1692-1735,
returned to him by his lenders after he had redeemed his loans.２５ While
most of the contracts were handwritten, a little more than 8 percent of
Bevel’s loans were recorded on forms purchased in Haarlem and Amster-
dam. It is not clear what motivated Bevel to rely so strongly on handwrit-
ten contracts, but the fact that he employed a clerk might be part of the
explanation.２６
Second, a thick ledger in an uninventoried part of the Amsterdam ar-
chive.２７ The ledger is filled with unstamped loan forms, but only a small
fraction of them was actually used. Liquor seller Hendrick Estinghuijsen
used 22 forms during the years 1723-1725 and footwear seller Fransiscus de
Witt filled in 63 during the period 1797-1799.２８ They both recorded the
deference of payment allowed to seafarers about to embark. These sea-
farers promised to pay upon their return in the Republic.
Third, a collection of 816 private loans signed between 1737 and 1809,
most of which were made on forms, has survived as well in an uninventor-
ied part of the Amsterdam archive.２９ Notes on dozens of them provided a
strong indication of why they have survived as a batch. On a bond signed 10
April 1796, for example, it was noted: ‘The content of this plus interest
received from the Lords Commissioners of the Insolvency Chamber of
25 ACA, Brants, inv.nrs. 1743, 1744A, 1744B. As these contracts were not checked against his
business ledgers, it is not possible to say which share of his overall borrowing they represent. It
is not unlikely, however, that they represented a major part of Bevel’s external funding. The
number of annual loans, for instance, increased as Bevel’s career as silk merchant took off and
diminished again during the last decade of his life. The number of annual loans was high (four-
teen times ten or more per year), loans were often rolled over, and the loans represented large
amounts of money (eleven times 100,000 guldens or more per year).
26 This is supported by the fact that the contracts are easy to read whereas contemporaries
complained about Bevel’s own handwriting. The presence of a clerk may have obviated the need
to use loan forms. See Van Eeghen, Archief.
27 ACA, Collectie Stadsarchief Amsterdam: koopmansboeken (entry number 5060) (further
Koopmansboeken), inv.nr. 128.
28 Estinghuijsen mostly sold gin and DeWitt mostly shoes and boots. Numerous loans were also
recorded on the back of the forms. See Christiaan van Bochove, ‘Seafarers and shopkeepers.
Credit in eighteenth-century Amsterdam’, Eighteenth-Century Studies (forthcoming).
29 ACA, Collectie Stadsarchief Amsterdam: schuldbekentenissen en obligaties (entry number
926) (further Schuldbekentenissen). Some of these loans were recorded privately (handwritten
but unstamped), others were recorded by a notary (handwritten but stamped).
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this city following the 5% settlement of fl. 205:18.’３０ Many other contained
notes saying ‘settled in the Insolvency Chamber’.３１ Directed by this infor-
mation around 90 percent of all loans could be linked to a borrower with a
file in the Insolvency Chamber.３２
The Insolvency Chamber was established in 1643 and insolvency cases
were delegated to it by the aldermen. Two changes in insolvency regula-
tions were responsible for the survival of this set of bonds. The new insol-
vency rules of 1777, the first revision after more than a century, stipulated
that all possessions of the insolvent henceforth had to be handed over to
the Insolvency Chamber. Previously the insolvent regained control over his
possessions after reaching a settlement with his lenders and he had to
make payments to them himself. Through the new regulations the Insol-
vency Chamber itself took responsibility as a trustee for making payments
to the lenders on behalf of the insolvent. Bonds that could be linked to an
insolvency case all entered the Insolvency Chamber after 1777. Quite simi-
larly the Code de Commerce, introduced per 1 March 1811, fundamentally
changed insolvency law and led to the dissolution of the Insolvency Cham-
ber. This second event made that the latest bonds entered the Insolvency
Chamber in 1810. It is therefore fairly certain that these new insolvency
rules, and not another reason, were responsible for the formation of this
remarkable collection.３３
Combined these three collections shed light on the whole of Amster-
dam’s social ladder. Loans in the Insolvency Chamber collection ranged
between as little as 20.25 guldens and as much as 25,000 guldens, but
averaged 1,254 guldens with a median of 700 guldens. Although almost 72
percent of all loans were for 1,000 guldens or less, only four loans smaller
30 ‘Den inhoud dezes van Heeren Commissarisen der desolate boedel kamer dezer stad bene-
vens inter: ontfangen volgens accord a vijff p c[to] met f205:18.’
31 ‘Afgehandeld in desolate boedelkamer.’
32 ACA, Archief van de Commissarissen van de Desolate Boedelkamer (entry number 5072)
(further Desolate Boedelkamer). Record-linking was possible because the archive’s inventory
(Archief van de Commissarissen van de Desolate Boedelkamer [21 December 2010]) lists the
names, occupations, and years of all persons who entered the Insolvency Chamber. It is not
clear why the remaining borrowers could not be retrieved.
33 Goswin Moll, De Desolate Boedelskamer te Amsterdam. Bijdrage tot de kennis van het oud-
Hollandsch failliten-recht (Amsterdam 1879); W.F.H. Oldewelt, ‘Twee eeuwen Amsterdamse fail-
lissementen en het verloop van de conjunctuur (1636 tot 1838)’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 75
(1962) 421-435, 421-424; M. Aukema, ‘Andere tijden. Boedelafwikkeling in de 17e en 18e eeuw’,
Insolad Jaarboek 2007 (2007) 13-26, 13, 16-19. It should be pointed out, however, that loan con-
tracts have also survived in some insolvency files themselves. See, for instance, ACA, Koopmans-
boeken, inv.nr. 191 (for a 1701 form); ACA, Desolate Boedelkamer, inv.nrs. 3729, 5260.
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than one hundred guldens were included. This collection thus mainly re-
presents lenders and borrowers from middling groups, something that is
confirmed by the occupations of insolvent borrowers.３４ The lack of really
small loans might imply that at the left-hand side of the loan size distribu-
tion there existed a threshold below which people dealt with loans (or
insolvencies) differently. It is here that the unstamped seafarer forms filled
a lacuna. As shopkeepers Hendrick Estinghuijsen and Fransiscus de Witt
belonged to Amsterdam’s middling groups and they provided small loans
to borrowers lower on the social and economic ladder. Estinghuijsen’s
loans ranged between 2.80 and 46.00 guldens and had average and median
values of 14.66 and 10.50 guldens. De Witt’s loans were even more modest.
They ranged between 0.35 and 30.00 guldens and had average and median
values of 6.22 and 4.80 guldens.３５ The recorded destinations included the
Baltic, Greenland, Suriname, and the Mediterranean. This suggests that
this type of form was widely used in a shipping town like Amsterdam.
Quite likewise, truly large loans are underrepresented at the right-hand
side of the spectrum because insolvencies of important merchant houses
were often taken care off in amicable settlements instead of through the
Insolvency Chamber.３６ Bevel’s loan contracts provide a good solution to
this omission. That Bevel himself belonged to the elite is illustrated well by
the fact that his daughter could bring 500,000 guldens into her marriage
with a son of the respectable merchant family De Neufville. Bevel’s borrow-
ing was in line with what one would expect of an important merchant. The
total sum borrowed through the loan contracts studied here adds up to
around 2.6 million guldens. Loans ranged between as little as 50 guldens
and as much as 50,000 guldens, but averaged 8,114 guldens with a median of
6,000 guldens. Bevel’s lenders included burgomaster Egidius van den
34 Archief van de Commissarissen van de Desolate Boedelkamer. See Clé Lesger, ‘Stagnatie en
stabiliteit. De economie tussen 1730 en 1795’, in: Willem Frijhoff and Maarten Prak (eds.), Geschie-
denis van Amsterdam II-2 (Amsterdam 2005) 219-265; Clé Lesger, ‘De locatie van het Amster-
damse winkelbedrijf in de achttiende eeuw’, Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis
4 (2007) 35-70 for estimates of the size of this group.
35 People employed in the maritime sector could also raise loans in other ways. See Christiaan
van Bochove and Ton van Velzen, ‘Loans to Salaried Employees. The Case of the Dutch East India
Company, 1602-1794’, European Review of Economic History 18 (2014) 19-38. It is at this left-hand
side of the spectrum where most pawnshop loans should be situated as well. See Anne E.C.
McCants, 'Goods at pawn. The overlapping world of material possessions and family finance in
early modern Amsterdam', Social Science History 31:2 (2007) 213-238; Pit Dehing and Marjolein ’t
Hart, ‘Linking the fortunes: currency and banking, 1550-1800’, in: ’t Hart, Jonker and Van Zanden,
Financial history, 37-63, 45.
36 Oldewelt, ‘Amsterdamse faillissementen’, 429.
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Bempden and Elizabeth Tielens, one of the wealthiest people in the Re-
public and married to yet another burgomaster. Le Moine de l'Espine's
merchant manual suggests that other merchants also widely used privately
recorded loans.３７
Figure 3. The basic loan form
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
37 Kees Zandvliet, De 250 rijksten van de Gouden Eeuw. Kapitaal, macht, familie en levensstijl
(Amsterdam 2006) 11-12. The differences between loans recorded in handwritten contracts and
forms were modest. The average sizes were 8,220 and 7,007 guldens and median sizes were 6,000
and 6,250 guldens. Le Moine de l’Espine, Koophandel, 571-585.
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５ The basic loan form
The forms available in the sources discussed above suggest that the basic
form was for a borrower who offered a general mortgage (‘myn Persoon en
alle myne Goederen’) as security for the loan (see Figure 3).３８ This was an
informal loan that gave the lender a secondary claim on the borrower’s
possessions (as did notarised loans).３９ In case of insolvency, holders of
secondary claims divided what was left after the preferential claims had
been paid out.４０ Evidence in the insolvency files confirms that loan forms
were treated accordingly. Loans and loan forms were thus defined and
embedded in Amsterdam’s legal structure. This is important because trans-
actions would only be sustainable when they could be recorded in enforce-
able contracts. This basic contract seems to have functioned properly, but
in one instance a borrower promised to sign a notarised deed when such
would be demanded by the lender (‘Ook verbinde mij desgerequireert
wordende deese notariaal te passeren.’). This was presumably motivated
by the fact that notarised deeds, contrary to privately recorded contracts,
were considered authentic documents.４１
On the form it could be specified whether the loan was received in cash
(‘contant’ or ‘courant’) or in bank (‘bank’) money. The latter was only ob-
served a few times because the artisans and traders that ended up in the
Insolvency Chamber probably did not use the Wisselbank extensively.４２
38 J.H. Huerks and Dirk Claassen (borrowers) and the trustees of Wouter Lambertz’ estate
(lenders) on 27 July 1794 changed ‘geld’ into ‘goederen’ and ‘onaangetelde gelden’ into ‘ongele-
verde goederen’ and turned the form into a deferred payments form. See Paolo Fulghieri and
Eitan Goldman, ‘The design of debt contracts’, in: Anjan V. Thakor and Arnoud W.A. Boot (eds.),
Handbook of financial intermediation and banking (Amsterdam 2008) 5-40 for a formal discussion
of contract design.
39 The header on the forms sold by Gerret Boman (signed 3 May 1787) referred to the loans as
‘Onderhandse obligatie’. In Thomas Thaarup’s insolvency file (see below) the lenders referred to
their loans in similar terms. See ACA, Desolate Boedelkamer, inv.nr. 6229.
40 Regulations issued by the town of Amsterdam stipulated that tax arrears and debts registered
with the aldermen held preference in case of an insolvency. A tax levied by the Insolvency
Chamber and the curator’s salary also held preference. When a collateral was used that did not
allow the lender to recover the full principal, the remainder would be included with the second-
ary claims. Moll, Desolate boedelskamer; Oldewelt, ‘Amsterdamse faillissementen’; Aukema, ‘An-
dere tijden’.
41 R. Huijbrecht, ‘Het notariaat in de gewesten Holland en Zeeland’, in: A.Fl. Gehlen and P.L.
Nève (eds.), Het notariaat in de Lage Landen (± 1250-1842). Opstellen over de geschiedenis van het
notariaat in de Lage Landen vanaf de oorsprong tot in de negentiende eeuw (Deventer 2005) 145-
190.
42 Dehing, Geld in Amsterdam, 133-136 performed quantitative and prosopographical research
that confirms this.
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Barend Berckhoff, who received 10,000 bank guldens from Jan van Dilsen
on 9 April 1790, was one of the exceptions. Simon Bevel, however, used
forms on which ‘bank money’ was already pre-printed.
The basic form was flexible in two ways. First, the loan could be rolled-
over (‘Prolongatie’). The revaluation that took place at this moment en-
abled lender and borrower to end a loan or to renew with or without
changing loan terms.４３ To some forms the parties added that rolling over
would automatically take place unless lender and borrower informed each
other about redemptions some months in advance.４４ Jacoba de Clercq
(lender) and Hendrik Smit (borrower) also added that annual instalments
had to be made in case their loan would be rolled over. Only in few
instances was the rolling over of a loan also explicitly recorded as such on
the form.
Second, the instrument was transferable because the borrower recog-
nised a debt to his lender or the bearer of the form (‘ofte Toonder deezes’).
Only one such transaction could be identified with certainty, however.４５
This transfer was made by Gerret van den Boll who had lent out 200
guldens on 4 March 1789 but sold this investment shortly afterwards. Boll
noted on the form ‘for me to bearer G. ter Veer’ and already on 28 January
and 19 May 1790 a Gerrit ter Veer signed for having received payments.４６ It
is not surprising, however, that there is little evidence of such transfers.
The use of general mortgages suggests after all that lenders initially felt
comfortable about their borrowers’ ability to repay. Obtaining even a
rough measure of a borrower’s net wealth surely will have required a
certain level of familiarity. The downside of this familiarity was that it
reduced the potential for transfers because lenders would have found it
43 This is what Simon Bevel experienced with respect to the interest rate of his one-year loan of
1 March 1698. While initially set at 5 percent it was lowered to 4 percent in 1703 but increased
again to 4.5 percent in 1706. This suggests that in this part of the market both lenders and
borrowers had to conform to market conditions.
44 As did widow Nolte (leender) and Casper Hendrik Prante (borrower) on 9 February 1789:
‘Den leender & den geltopnemer zullen malkander drie maanden van te voorren waarschouwen
om het op te eijsen of af te doen.’
45 As the information on the forms is incomplete, it is also difficult to establish whether a ‘real’
transfer had taken place. Take, for instance, the 500 guldens that Joseph Assel borrowed on 2 June
1793 from Magtel van Berkum. In the margin of the form it was noted (later, it seems) that the
form belonged to a Joannes Engelbertus Verlinden (‘toebehorende aan’). The form does not make
clear how Joannes had become the owner. Amsterdam’s marriage bans show, however, that the
two had registered their marriage on 21 July 1785. Magtel had presumably died after lending the
money to Assel, making Joannes her inheritor. See http://stadsarchief.amsterdam.nl/archieven/
archiefbank/indexen/ondertrouwregisters (11 December 2012).
46 ‘Voor mijn aan toonder G. ter Veer’.
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difficult to credibly convey their private information about a borrower’s
creditworthiness to a third party. Screening, monitoring, and enforcing
would all have been more difficult for such a third party.
The existence of certain degrees of familiarity between lenders and
borrowers is supported in quite some instances on forms in the Insolvency
Chamber collection. In eighteen loans the relationship with the lender is
explicitly given (e.g. ‘my father’) and on some thirty additional loans the
family names of lender and borrower were the same. A further 135 can be
identified if it is assumed that repeat transactions are a sign of familiarity.４７
The Bevel loans also provide compelling evidence of the importance of
such relationships. Egidius van den Bempden provided 22 loans during
the period 1699-1725, the longest found for Bevel’s lenders. Similar long-
term relationship existed with many others, the most important being
Elizabeth Tielens who provided most loans (27) of all his lenders. Elizabeth
probably was acquainted with Bevel through her father, the silk merchant
Michiel Tielens.４８
Compared to other forms of paper wealth that were common in Am-
sterdam during (e.g. cashiers’ notes, Holland bills, and East India Company
shares) or after (e.g. paper money) the pre-industrial period, most of the
private loans discussed in this article were thus not very liquid. They were
not traded easily and their circulation was limited.４９ Endorsing loans to
increase tradability, as was common with bills of exchange, was no option
because loans could be rolled over. Whereas terms of bills of exchange
were fixed and fairly short, they could become fairly long for loans. This
created time horizons beyond which the original lender, or those who
47 Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal, Priceless markets follow a similar procedure for distin-
guishing between loans negotiated through networks and intermediaries. It should be noted that
these close ties will also have made some lenders reluctant to demand repayment when their
borrowers experienced financial difficulties. This is in line with the small settlement percentages
found in the insolvency files, but these are consistent too with borrowers experiencing disastrous
events. See Oldewelt, ‘Amsterdamse faillissementen’.
48 Zandvliet, Rijksten, 11-12; Sjoukje Colenbrander, Zolang de weefkunst bloeit. Zijdeweverijen in
Amsterdam en Haarlem, 1585-1750 (Amsterdam 2010) 18, 59, 71-80.
49 The securities-backed loans discussed below may have been the main exception.
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endorsed after him, were unwilling to vouch for the creditworthiness of the
borrower (or each other).５０
６ Offering additional security
Lenders unwilling to lose money due to contingencies faced by their bor-
rowers demanded additional security. Booksellers consequently also of-
fered forms with the basic text to which sections on collateral or pledges
were added. The first variant of this form (see Figure 4) added a paragraph
for handing over collateral (‘Pand der minne’). Not only the collateral was
specified, but several other arrangements were made too. First, the bor-
rower paid the storage costs (‘de Huur’), remained solely liable for every-
thing that could happen to the goods, and could not access the goods prior
to full repayment of the loan.５１ Second, the contract included a margin call
stipulation. This forced the borrower to post additional collateral in case
prices decreased.５２ Third, if the borrower did not honour the contract the
lender was only held to a twenty-four hour warning period before he could
sell or auction the goods (‘24 uuren voor af ’t zy mondeling of schriftelyk
gewaarschouwd’). Surpluses, however, should be returned to the borrower
whereas he remained liable for any deficits.
A special type of collateralised loan form was designed for the use of
securities.５３ These forms were called Beleenings-Obligatiën en Renverzaalen
(see Figure 5). This form must have been used quite frequently because of
50 Joost Jonker, ‘Kassierspapier’, in: Jan Lucassen (ed.), Gids van de papiergeld-verzameling van
het Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief. Catalogus van de collectie tot circa 1850 (Amster-
dam 1992) 107-119; Jonker, Merchants, bankers, and middlemen, 173-177; Lodewijk Petram, ‘The
world’s first stock exchange. How the Amsterdam market for Dutch East India Company shares
became a modern securities market, 1602-1700’ (dissertation University of Amsterdam 2011,
http://dare.uva.nl); Christiaan van Bochove, ‘Configuring financial markets in preindustrial Eur-
ope’, The Journal of Economic History 73:1 (2013) 247-278. Collateral theoretically solved such
problems, but transferring collateral from one warehouse to the other was unpractical.
51 On the second: ‘het perykel van Diefstal, Brand, Rovery, Plonderinge, Vermindering, Bederf-
felykheid, en ’t geene verders zouden kunnen overkomen’. On the third: ‘gemelde goederen
zullen ook niet weggehaalt mogen worden, voor en al eer ’t voorgemelde Capitaal, benevens
Interesse en Onkosten daar op verschoten, betaald en voldaan zullen wezen’.
52 ‘ingevalle de voornoemde goederen in prys mogten komen te daalen, zo verbinde [. . . ] op
vermaninge aanstonds het verschil der mindere waarde te suppleeren’.
53 Such a form sold by J.H. Marlof is also available on the website CollectWeb (Corné Akker-
mans Veilingen, item 7633, http://www.collectweb.nl/item/7633/, 11 December 2012).
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the large amounts of domestic and foreign securities issued in Amsterdam
and the Republic.５４ Contrary to the other forms this form treated rolling
over as the default option. Lenders and borrowers had to inform each other
a certain time in advance if they wished to cancel the loan. The remaining
conditions were similar to the regular form, but the margin call stipulation
allowed one to specify exactly the loan to value ratio of the collateral.
Another variant of the basic form allowed the borrower to add a pledge
to the contract (see Figure 6). Promises like this were not simply paper
promises. F.W. Muller experienced this in 1789 when (s)he had to pay the
200 gulden loan borrowed by Jean Daniel Gradelle in 1782.
While these variant forms thus broadened the group of users it should
be taken into account that people not always used them to complete such
transactions. Some used the basic form and added themselves that a col-
lateral had been handed over. This is, for instance, what Joannes van der
Bergh did on 18 July 1792 when he borrowed 400 guldens from Jan van
Bleijenberg’s widow.５５ No specific form was required for adding pledges
either. When Jacob Scheenen borrowed 200 guldens from Christiaan Haar-
kop on 15 December 1790 Paulus Knuijt was simply added as a pledge.５６
54 For a discussion of this type of financial transaction see Joost Jonker,Merchants, bankers, and
middlemen.
55 ‘Daar voor in pand der mine een kustinbrief op een huijs staande voor aan in de Nes van outs
genaamt ’t Melk Meijsje.’
56 ‘Ik ondergetekende stele mij als borg voor de bovenstaande soma te voldoen ingevalle bo-
vengetekende mogte komen te manqueren.’
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Figure 4a. Form for collateralized loans
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
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Figure 4b. Form for collateralized loans
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
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Figure 5a. Form for loans with securities as collateral
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
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Figure 5b. Form for loans with securities as collateral
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
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Figure 6a. Form for loans with pledges
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
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Figure 6b. Form for loans with pledges
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
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７ Specific target groups
The foregoing forms did not suffice for all borrowers, however. For at least
two of such groups, multiple borrowers and seafarers, specific forms were
found. The first one existed for business partners and married couples. The
one for married couples appeared frequently in the Insolvency Chamber
collection (see Figure 7). This standardised text took care of two things.
First, the wife relinquished the protected legal position she had in Amster-
dam (and elsewhere in the Republic). Lenders who wanted to have re-
course to all household possession therefore required married borrowers
to use this form. Second, it made sure that the husband could not refer the
lender to his wife, and the other way around. They were both fully liable.５７
The second kind of form concerned deferred payments for goods sold to
seafarers (see Figure 8). These forms recorded the goods and their value as
well as the name of the seafarer’s ship, its captain, and its destination. Such
information was important because payments would only be due when a
seafarer safely returned to the Republic. Since no payments were due when
a ship sank the forms were called Brieven op behouden Reyse, or notes on
safe arrival.５８ The borrower attached his person and goods as well as his
salary (‘maand-gelden’) as security for repayment upon his return. Like all
other forms, this form was also payable to bearer. The seafarer forms dif-
fered from the others in that they were unstamped and two of them were
printed on one piece of A4-size paper. This suggests that for smaller loans
the combined costs for stamp duty (and litigation) and form were deemed
too high. Lenders and borrowers, helped by the booksellers, thus reduced
transaction costs by economising on paper and by lending without a
stamp.
57 The form for business partners addressed the latter too: ‘Wy Ondergeschrevene bekennen te
zamen, en elk een voor ’t geheel (onder renuntiatie van de Beneficien van divisie, excussie, en de
ordre, als den effecte derzelver verstaande) deugdelyk schuldig te wezen [. . . ].’
58 Salvaged goods were not taken into consideration (‘en soo by verongelukken of schade van
het Schip, yets van dese Goederen geborgen of gesalveert mogte worden, zal het tot voordeel of
profijt van den eygenaar komen’).
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Figure 7. Form for loans to married couples
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
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Figure 8. Form for recording deferred payments of sailors
Source: ACA, Koopmansboeken.
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８ Purchase and use of loan forms
No information about the daily use of loan forms is available from second-
ary sources, but the forms in the Insolvency Chamber collection yield some
insights. The case of merchant-skipper Thomas Thaarup, the most fre-
quently appearing borrower in the Insolvency Chamber collection, sheds
light on the purchase of loan forms, for instance.５９ In 1796 Thaarup re-
ceived goods and money with a value of just under 60,000 guldens from
eighteen different people. All these transactions were recognised through
loan forms. As Thaarup’s ship was confiscated as prize by the English in the
West Indies, he could not honour these financial obligations and his case
consequently entered the Insolvency Chamber on 8 September 1800.
Thaarup signed the forms of five booksellers situated in the commercial
district (see Table 1).６０ This shows that Thaarup had not bought one big
Table 1. Loan forms signed by Thomas Thaarup in 1796
Date Bookshop Year in stamp
10 April Jacobus Vriese 1796
J.H. Marlof 1796
12 April J.H. Marlof 1796
18 April J.H. Marlof 1796
19 April Weduwe H.W. & C. Dronsberg 1796
22 April J.H. Marlof 1796
25 April Jacobus Vriese 1796
Jacobus Vriese 1796
30 April Jacobus Vriese 1796
5 May A. van der Kroe 1795
9 May A. van der Kroe 1795
J.H. Marlof 1796
12 May Jacobus Vriese 1795
Jacobus Vriese 1795
17 May A. van der Kroe 1796
20 May Barend Kramer 1795
6 June J.H. Marlof 1796
9 June J.H. Marlof 1796
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
59 ACA, Desolate Boedelkamer, inv.nr. 6229.
60 Widow H.W. & C. Dronsberg (one) and A. van der Kroe (three) were located on Dam Square,
Barend Kramer (one) and J.H. Marlof (seven) at the Rokin, and Jacobus Vriese (six) in the
Kalverstraat. See Van de Graft, Lotgevallen on the Dronsberg company.
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stack of forms in anticipation of business transactions. Thaarup may occa-
sionally have purchased several forms, but it is not unlikely that forms
were purchased only once a deal was negotiated or that they already
were in the possession of the lender.
Table 2. A comparison of years of signing and stamping of loan form
Year signed – year stamped Number Share
-10 1 0.1%
-6 1 0.1%
-4 1 0.1%
-3 4 0.5%
-2 1 0.1%
-1 12 1.5%
0 486 62.1%
1 226 28.9%
2 22 2.8%
3 16 2.0%
4 6 0.8%
5 1 0.1%
9 2 0.3%
11 1 0.1%
18 1 0.1%
25 1 0.1%
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
Note: Based on the 782 forms for which unambiguous information was available. Around 75 percent of the loans with a stamp
from the previous year (i.e. +1), were signed in the first six months of the new year.
The latter might be supported by the forms from bookseller Jacobus Vriese
that Thaarup signed. Two of those were stamped in 1795 but signed on 12
May 1796, while four were stamped in 1796 and signed on 10, 25, and 30
April. Since Vriese would have sold his old inventory first, it would be
much of a coincidence if Thaarup had purchased Vriese’s last 1795 forms
and his first 1796 forms. This only leaves the possibility that some lenders
had forms at hand in anticipation of business opportunities. This is sup-
ported by Table 2, which shows that one-year old forms were quite fre-
quently used. Table 2 also provides evidence of loans that were signed
‘before’ they were stamped. These most likely represented oral loans that
were now recorded in writing.
Once a form was purchased the contracting parties had to record the
loan details. Figures 3-8 illustrate how this was done. However, on 22
January 1790 Jan Adriaan de Lange (borrower) and Christian van Orsoy
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(lender) agreed on a redemption scheme a little more elaborate than com-
monly used. Whereas most redeemed in full when a loan matured, De
Lange would repay the first quarter on 8 February 1791 and additional
quarters in the subsequent years.６１
Most borrowers signed with their name, but a mark was sometimes
used as well. On 16 August 1792 Dirk Weesing signed himself, but his wife
Geertruy Wilthaagen used her mark (‘dit is haar merk’). They did the same
on 6 February 1793. On another form it was recorded on 18 June 1793 ‘Dit is
t merk van de weduwe Swiering’.
When a form had been completed, interest payments and redemptions
were often recorded on it as well. Fourteen annual interest payments of 10
guldens were recorded, for instance, on the 250 gulden loan that Fredrik
van Brummelen made to Johannes Heedenrijk in 1792. Jurjan Grutter re-
ceived three redemptions of 50 guldens on the 400 gulden loan made to
Johannis Palick in 1793. Nothing was recorded on Pieter Ebeling’s loan to
Salomon Mijer (24 April 1780). On the back it was merely recorded, per-
haps by the Insolvency Chamber, that ten interest payments had been
made.６２ Jurrian Mijling twice rolled over the 500 guldens he had borrowed
for twelve months on 6 February 1781 and, exceptionally, recorded this on
the form.６３ Despite the absence of such notes on most loans, rolling over
occurred frequently. Since many loans were signed long before insolvency
this should not be interpreted as an inability to pay.
９ Intermediation
The foregoing presumably related to loans on a non-intermediated credit
market in which lenders and borrowers were familiar with each other. This
61 ‘De bovenstaande somma sal betalen in vier termijnen te weeten pmo februarij 1791 een vierde
part en so vervolgens alle jaren een vierde part met de verscheenen intressen ijder jaar.’ Cornelis
Lugt (borrower) and Leendert Buitenpost (lender) also did something uncommon when they
added a second loan to the existing one. ‘Ontfangen van de boovestaande Monsr Ld Buijtenpost
de somma van vijfhonderd guldens op conditie als booven.’ The first loan was dated 1 May 1790
and the second 1 May 1792. The loan terms show that accrued interest can not have been the
(sole) reason for this second loan.
62 ‘10 de intressen zijn betaald van Ao 1780 af tot 1790.’
63 ‘Gebrolongeert (sic!) voor nog een jaar’.
AUP – 156 x 234 – 3B2-APP flow Pag. 0069
<TSEG1403_art03_1Kv19_proef7 ▪ 04-11-14 ▪ 16:26>
69VAN BOCHOVE & KOLE
UNCOVERING PRIVATE CREDIT MARKETS: AMSTERDAM, 1660-1809
obviously does not preclude the existence of a credit market where de-
mand and supply were brought together by intermediaries.６４ The ability
to include additional security through collateral or pledges made loan
forms suitable for use on this anonymous part of the market as well. How-
ever, by design, the Insolvency Chamber collection is not adequate for
establishing the existence of such a market and the use of loan forms on
it. After all, when matching lenders to unfamiliar borrowers, brokers would
likely have suggested the inclusion of collateral or pledges in the loan
contract. Alternatively, they could have rationed credit to their most reli-
able and creditworthy borrowers. Both strategies would have resulted in
high-quality loans unlikely to default and show up in the Insolvency Cham-
ber.
The Insolvency Chamber collection nevertheless contains references to
brokers on three loan forms. On two of these was written that the transac-
tion was recorded in the presence of a broker: Adrianus Mulder on 2 May
1786 and Ermeling & Scheper on 19 September 1789. To the third form was
added that redemptions should be announced or demanded via brokers
Tidemans & Scholten (24 November 1773). No collateral or pledges were
included in these loans, but the lenders may have felt secure because in all
three instances they had recourse to more than one borrower: a married
coupled once and two business partners twice.
Further details about this intermediated credit market cannot be estab-
lished through the three collections analysed in this article. However, the
elaborate explanation in Le Moine de l’Espine’s merchant manual of how
brokers brought together demand for and supply of collateralised loans
suggests that the market may have been substantial. This may be con-
firmed by the fact that, according to Le Moine de l’Espine, such loans
were typically recorded on loan forms.６５ This suggests that in pre-industrial
Amsterdam there not only existed a large non-intermediated credit mar-
ket, but also a large intermediated one. Establishing how large these seg-
ments were relative to each other and whether the Amsterdam credit
64 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff and Peter Temin, ‘Beyond markets and hierar-
chies. Toward a new synthesis of American business history’, The American Historical Review 108
(2003) 404-433 for a discussion of these different ways of organising transactions.
65 ‘Dese Beleeningen, geschieden meest altydt door bemiddeling van Maakelaars, die haar werk
daarvan maaken, om de gene die meer Goederen als geldt hebben, een Capitaal daarop ter leen
te besorgen, en den Renteniers of Beleenders goede en suffisante Onderpanden te beschikken.’ Le
Moine de l’Espine, Koophandel, 573-574.
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market primarily relied on the market (non-intermediated) or banks (in-
termediated) is unfortunately not possible.６６
１０ Conclusion
Three archival collections allowed this article to uncover a large private
credit market in early modern Amsterdam. As became clear, however,
these sources mostly related to a part of that market which relied on net-
works for bringing together demand and supply and where loans were
recorded on (un)stamped loan forms. Orally recorded loans, (un)stamped
handwritten loan contracts, and intermediated credit thus remained un-
derstudied and warrant more research. Necessary too is a deeper insight
into the mechanisms guiding the choice of contract – Simon Bevel used
various options alongside each other, after all – and the channel through
which credit was obtained. Yet, even despite these caveats, De Vries and
Van der Woude’s hoarding hypothesis is hard to reconcile with what
clearly was an active and substantial private credit market.
More importantly perhaps than the size of Amsterdam’s private credit
market was the fact that a large part of the population could participate in
this market. The diversity of form types allowed lenders and borrowers in
all segments of society to shape their transactions in satisfactory ways. This
also meant, for instance, that rich people were not restricted to the secu-
rities-backed loans discussed by Jonker, but that they could also make their
wealth available through loans that were secured in other ways (e.g. on the
collateral of merchant goods). The broad use of forms is confirmed by the
size of the loan sums, which ranged between as little as 0.35 guldens and as
much as 50,000 guldens, as well as the wide range of occupations of bor-
rowers (from ordinary seafarers to a wealthy silk merchant) and lenders
(from shopkeepers to rentiers).
The explanation for the success of loan forms is threefold. First, forms
were formulated in the proper legal terms. This meant that a score of
regular transactions could be cast in appropriate terms without the legal
advice of notaries, for instance. While contracting outside notarial offices
kept transaction costs low, loan forms were still embedded in the Dutch
Republic’s legal system. Second, forms were tailored to the needs of lenders
and borrowers. Loans could be secured by adding all sorts of collateral, by
66 Cf. Ann M. Carlos and Larry Neal, ‘Amsterdam and London as financial centers in the eight-
eenth century’, Financial History Review 18:1 (2011) 21-46.
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naming pledges, and by including additional borrowers. These techniques
mitigated the lenders’ need to spread risks and ration credit and allowed
merchants like Simon Bevel to obtain large sums from a single lender.
Third, the threshold for using forms was low. Forms were cheap and were
sold by well over a hundred bookshops across town. These were not only
situated in the city centre, but also in Amsterdam’s poorer neighbour-
hoods.
The Amsterdam case thus shows that pre-industrial credit markets
could mobilise a lot of money. Lenders and borrowers presumably capita-
lised on the familiarity created through the shared membership of
churches, guilds, and militias, living in the same neighbourhood, by doing
business with each other, or simply by being friends or belonging to the
same family. Where these networks did not suffice, moreover, brokers
stood ready to match lenders and borrowers. The credit market that this
sustained in the Dutch Republic (and the Kingdom of The Netherlands
afterwards), together with the common use of securities-backed loans
there, may be part of the explanation for why banks only emerged once
industry truly became capital intensive. As long as networks and non-bank
intermediaries provided cheap and easy access to secure loans, the market
was too thin for banks to emerge. The Amsterdam case therefore shows
that financial markets should not be assessed by the presence or absence of
banks, but rather by what they could accomplish.
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